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DIGNIFYING RIGHTS: A Comment on Jeremy

Waldron's Dignity, Rights, and
Responsibilities
Katherine Franke*
In Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities' Jeremy Waldron offers a
characteristically thoughtful and elegant account of rights, or as he calls it,
responsibility-rights. As Waldron rightfully acknowledges, rights
understood as a form of responsibility are not meant to capture every
species of rights, but to provide us with a new analytic resource for better
understanding a particular subset of rights that curiously entail a form of
responsibility on the part of the rights holder. The link between rights and
responsibility, Waldron argues, is built upon a strong foundational
commitment to human dignity. The most compelling contribution of
Waldron's paper is his careful unbraiding of the complex relationship of
rights, responsibility, and a liberal conception of human dignity.
This new work on responsibility-rights should be seen as a part with
Waldron's other recent writing elaborating a robust conception of human
dignity based not on the inherent moral worth of each human person, but
rather on a notion of status or rank. "[T]he modem notion of human dignity
involves an upwards equalization of rank," 2 Waldron tells us in his 2009
Tanner Lecture, "[W]e now try to accord to every human being something
of the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that was formerly accorded
to nobility."' In this new Shoen Lecture, Waldron urges us to consider how
rights are either founded upon or expressive of the value of human dignity.
My aim in this response-essay is to consider more deeply the
implications of an account of rights that is premised upon an aristocratic
conception of human dignity.' Specifically, I am interested in the way in
which responsibility is not merely a symptom or correlate of a certain set of
Isidor and Seville Sulzbacher Professor of Law and Director of the Center for Gender
*
& Sexuality Law, Columbia University. C 2012 by Katherine Franke. A portion of this essay
derives from a lecture given at the Chautauqua Institution.
1. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107 (2012).
See Waldron's Tanner Lectures "Dignity and Rank" and "Law, Dignity, and Self2.
Control" in Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights: The 2009 Tanner Lectures at UC

Berkeley 29 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series,
Working Paper No. 09-50, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1461220.
3.
Id.
Waldron describes dignity as a "quintessentially aristocratic virtue." Id. at 43.
4.
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rights understood as responsibility-rights, but in how behaving responsibly
is expected of those who aim to have their rights claims recognized by
others. In this sense, possessing dignity is not inherent in one's identity as
human, but rather takes work, a kind of work that Waldron describes as "the
voluntary self-application of norms."' That work can be understood as
preparatory for a scene then to follow. Only once others, dignified others,
recognize that this virtuous work has been done, can one "be dignified," just
as one might "be beatified." Dignity in this sense is not something one
simply has, but rather is earned through hard work on the self, and is fully
settled only once it has been recognized by another.
It is these two aspects of the responsibility-dignity-rights loop that I want
to press in this essay: First, dignity is an accomplishment, a normative
practice which requires work. It is something you can, indeed must, earn
and can risk losing. There is a self-mastery implicit in, yet essential to an
entitlement to the dignity, rank, and expectation of respect that were
formerly accorded only to nobility. This first step I'll call recognizability.It
precedes the second essential component, without which, neither dignity nor
the rights claims that are its expression, can come off: recognition. The
emergence of dignity is always given over to others to recognize dignity in
another. In this sense, dignity is accomplished more relationally than
ontologically, according to a set of norms that facilitate that recognition,
and are administered by a range of social, legal, and political institutions.
The claims of same-sex couples to a right to civil marriage offer a cogent
example of how this two-step process works. The lesbian and gay
community understood that it had reputational work to do to ready itself for
the successful presentation of a rights claim to legislatures and courts. In
this sense, recognizabililty preceded recognition. Yet this example also
teaches us how notions of dignity and responsibility-rights come at a price.
At least in this context, they provide a less than satisfactory predicate for
legal-citizenship.6

Waldron's elegant account of human dignity, upon which his notion of
responsibility-rights derives, seeks to steer clear of anchorage in the wholly
theological, as does Robert George or Pope John Paul II, or in the more
general notion of the sacred, as does Kant. Instead he prefers a more liberal,
5. Id. at 47.
In the Second Tanner Lecture Waldron tells us that "[i]f I were to give a name the
6.
status I have in mind, the high rank or dignity attributed to every member of the community and
associated with their fundamental rights, I might choose the term 'legal citizenship."' Id. at 56.
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though oddly aristocratic, notion of rank or status to capture the "special
something" that is human dignity. Grounding the analysis, at first, in
etymology, Waldron traces the term dignity back to its Roman then early
English roots.7 The genealogy teaches us that early uses of the term dignitas
"embodied the idea of the honor, the privileges and the deference due to
rank or office."' Modernizing the notion in liberal terms, Waldron preserves
the dignity that derives from rank or status while flattening out the
hierarchies among humans sorted traditionally by rank, nobility, or royalty.
All humans, as a consequence of this move, enjoy an upwards equalization
of rank akin to the status enjoyed by those who formally sat atop the human
ladder. He finds inspiration for this move in the underappreciated work of
Gregory Vlastos: "[W]e organize ourselves not like a society without
nobility or rank, but like an aristocratic society which has just one rank (and
a pretty high rank at that) for all of us." 9
Reading this, I am struck by a number of puzzles: How, one might
wonder, can rank that does no meaningful sorting (since it is "rank" among
equals) retain the "special something" that inheres in dignity, a virtue that
was previously awarded only to those with the highest status, thereby
setting them apart from their depraved and sorry inferiors? Doesn't the idea
of rank or status depend upon things to be ranked or sorted according to
some standard of value? Rank survives as the structure or container, if you
will, for human dignity, but how so? How can the virtue/value that was
distributed on the basis of ranking in pre-modern, non-liberal societies
retain value once we have announced that all comparison or differentiation
among humans must end?
Waldron, I believe, addresses these questions by preserving hierarchy
not among humans, but between humans and other animals. While the point
is not fully developed or defended in the Shoen or the Tanner Lectures, it is
quite clear that Waldron regards humans of the highest moral order, capable
of reason, self-control, voluntary conformance to a norm, and willful
uprightness of bearing. This "uprightness of bearing" Waldron cleverly
terms "a sort of moral orthopedics associated with rights,""o but it could just
as easily be understood as evolutionary in nature, gesturing in the direction
of a differentiation between man and ape, human and animal." This idea is,
7.

Waldron, supra note 1, at 1118-19.
Id. at 1118.
9.
Id. at 1120 (emphasis omitted) (citing Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality (1962),
reprintedin THEORIES OF RIGHTS 41 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984)).

8.

10.

11.

Id. at 1127.

Giorgio Agamben would offer a different contrast, that of the dignified human and the
Muselmanner-the walking dead of the camps. "The Muselmann is not only or not so much a
limit between life and death; rather, he marks the threshold between the human and the
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one of the principle aims in the closing lines of the Tanner Lectures,
wherein he defends an aristocratic, albeit egalitarian, conception of rank that
is to be distinguished from being treated like an animal:
This is what reactionaries always say: if we abolish distinctions of
rank, we will end up treating everyone like an animal, "and an
animal not of the highest order." But the ethos of human dignity
reminds us that there is an alternative: we can flatten out the scale
of status and rank and leave Marie Antoinette more or less where
she is. Everyone can eat cake .... 12
In this way, rank is able to retain its elevating virtue insofar as the capacity
for dignity is something that sets humans apart from and above other
inferior species of animals.
The anthro-centric and aristocratic roots of the Waldronian account of
dignity as rank are not where I want to dwell. Instead, I prefer to press
elsewhere: on the relation of dignity to role. For Waldron, dignity emerges
or is revealed in one's performance of a role:
[O]ne might speak of the dignity of a clergyman, such as a bishop,
in terms of his responsibility for the administration of a diocese, or
even the dignity of a rector, in terms of his elementary right to
administer the sacraments (or direct their administration) in a
particular parish."
Extending the clergical analogy to the rest of us, it seems that dignity
isn't something that one simply has by virtue of being a human (and not an
animal or a dilapidated housel4 ) but is something one earns, or better yet,
inhuman," Agamben writes. GIORGIo AGAMBEN, REMNANTS OF AUSCHWITZ: THE WITNESS AND
THE ARCHIVE 55 (Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Zone Books 2008) (1999). "The Muselmann has
... moved into a zone of the human where not only help but also dignity and self-respect have
become useless." Id. at 63. Relying on Primo Levi's account of life in the camps in The
Drowned and the Saved (1988), the Muselmdnner are characterized by their stooped manner and
their absence of walking upright. Id. at 157. Their enstoopification and degradation are
accomplished by the biopolitical project of the camps, resulting in the complete evacuation of
their humanity and their dignity, characterized by, as Agamben calls it, a bare life. Id. at 69.
Curiously, Agamben connects humanity to responsibility, but to different effect than does
Waldron, "[the survivor] knows that humanity and responsibility are something that the
deportee had to abandon when entering the camp." Id. at 59-60.
12. Waldron, supra note 2, at 68. Elsewhere he tells us in connection with the law of
torture: "People . . . will not be herded like cattle or broken like horses; they will not be beaten
like dumb animals or treated as bodies to be manipulated .

. .

. [Legal] force and coercion do not

work by reducing [persons] to a quivering mass of bestial, desperate terror." Jeremy Waldron,
Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudencefor the White House, 105 COLUM. L. REv. 1681,
1726-27 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Waldron, supra note 1, at 1121.
14. Waldron uses this term in the Tanner Lecture. See Waldron, supra note 2, at 45.
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works at. We are to be treated like a Duke not by dint of letters patent or
hereditary entitlement but because of individual desert. As such,
responsibility doesn't come into the picture once rights have been
recognized (such as the right to parental custody and control of a child
entailing a duty to exercise that control responsibility); rather dignity is to
be found in the responsible performance of one's role, as parent, as citizen,
as clergy, or as soldier. Waldron illustrates this notion by reference to Max
Weber's conception of politics as vocation, that the politician or statesman
assumes a "personal responsibility for what he does, a responsibility he
cannot and must not reject or transfer."" What is true for the public servant
and political leader, Waldron argues, holds equally true for the ordinary
citizen." Rights entail responsibilities, but more than that I want to suggest,
a rights claim will not be seriously entertained if one has not comported
oneself in a responsible manner as an antecedent to asserting the claim
itself. This may even be understood as a rule of standing: Those who are
irresponsible, undignified, (or dare I say beastly?), have no standing to
make rights claims.
The notion that dignity entails a convincing performance of
responsibility is in evidence when Waldron tells us:
When we hear the claim that someone has dignity, what comes to
mind are ideas such as: having a certain sort of presence;
uprightness of bearing; self-possession and self-control; selfpresentation as someone to be reckoned with; not being abject,
pitiable, distressed or overly submissive in circumstances of
adversity."
As we can see from this description, this work is thickly norm-driven and,
at bottom, social in nature. In a sense, the body is "exposed to social
crafting and form," and is "exposed to socially and politically articulated
forces as well as to the claims of sociality-including language, work and
desire."" This last notion, desire, is particularly intriguing insofar as it is
worth considering how the performance I am describing is motivated, in
significant part, by a desire to enact, or better yet, embody a social norm.
The performative nature of dignity, that it requires work, is the first point
that I want to press in this essay, and I will return to it in due course when I
15.

Max Weber, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS INSOCIOLOGY 95

(H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958).
16. Waldron, supra note 2, at 8-9.
17.

Id. at 11.

18. JUDITH BUTLER, FRAMES OF WAR: WHEN is LIFE GRIEVABLE? 3 (2009). Butler offers
this analysis in connection with the conditions of human precariousness, but they are useful in
illuminating the nature of structure of dignity as well.
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situate the critique in the same-sex marriage cases. My second point has to
do with the relational rather than ontological nature of dignity. On this I
may get no disagreement from Waldron, but the point deserves greater
elaboration than he was able to give in his Shoen lecture. For Hegel,
particularly according to Kojdve's reading," dignity, indeed the notion of
the human itself, is an intersubjective enterprise. It does not arise
intrinsically in the nature of the human being, or out of some mystical form
of elevation or lifting up, nor is the performance of role in a dignified
manner self-executing.2 0 Rather, human dignity is accomplished, if you will,
in the moment of recognition of the self by others. Hegel's focus is on the
bondsman's recognition of the master, but the productive potential of the
act of intersubjective recognition applies to all subjects, regardless of their
rank or status relative to one another.2 1
We find the fingerprints of Hegel's interest in recognition in Waldron's
paper, insofar as he acknowledges that dignity is no dignity at all if it is not
respected by others, and most importantly not recognized and respected by
the law and legal authority. Pushing the argument a bit further, one way to
understand what is going on when a person makes a rights claim is that they
are making a plea to be recognized by legal authority in a particular way: as
a being equal in rank to other dignified humans. What is sought is a kind of
solidarity or fraternity entailed in recognition, uplifting, elevating, or even
dignifying the disfavored party by announcing that a comparison or
differentiation must cease. Dignity results from "a performance of solidarity
through the foreclosure of negative valuation."22 What is being recognized
in a moment of this sort is the rights-bearing status of the individual so
pleading. Thus dignity is conferred as a consequence of, not predicate for,
this moment of uptake, this act of intersubjective recognition, which
operates according to a set of norms that facilitate and make possible that
recognition.
Curiously, in law human dignity is observed most often in the breach.23
Rather than extol the qualities of the dignified life in the case of dignified
human flourishing, courts more regularly find the opportunity to chart
dignity's contours when it has been lost or diminished in a particular case.

19. ALEXANDRE KOJEVE, INTRODUCTION TO THE READING OF HEGEL 3 (Allan Bloom ed.,
James H. Nichols, Jr. trans., Basic Books 1969) (1947).
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id
22. Stephen Riley, Observing the Breach: Dignity and the Limits ofPoliticalTheology, 19
LAW & CRITIQUE 115, 136 (2008).
23. Id. at 125.
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Thus it is worth noting that in the precincts of law, dignity's absence is
typically more palpable than its presence.
By examining the moments of breach, rather than starting from the point
of dignity fulfilled, as does Waldron, one learns different things about the
relationship of dignity to responsibility to rights. When the claim for breach
is being made the performative nature of human dignity, and the recognition
of rights that flows there from, are foregrounded.
Consider gay-rights litigation in the U.S. over the last quarter century.
The project at hand has increasingly become redemptive in nature. Only
when the disfavored, lower-caste group has been able to convincingly prove
that a category mistake has been made, and that indeed they are as
responsible as the higher caste, will their claim to rights-bearing status be
recognized. This project is not something that can take place overnight.
Rather it requires time. What's more, it requires work. The misunderstood
group must mount ritualized, repeated performances of responsibilized
citizenship designed, over time, to convince a court, a legislature, the
public, and to some degree themselves, that they have put their errant ways
behind them and/or that they have been horribly misunderstood. Substantial
numbers of lesbian and gay people have had to build lives, indeed lives on
view for the rest of the society to witness, characterized by commitment,
monogamy, parenting, moderation, and conformance with gender norms.
It's respectability that we're really talking about here.
Institutional politics take place next. Lawsuits are filed, bills are
introduced into state legislatures, and political action campaigns are
launched. The testimony in the litigation, the witnesses before the
legislatures, and the ad campaigns that run on television try to retell the
story of who we are, and of how we have been misunderstood, always
through a convincing portrayal of responsibility and respectability.
In these efforts to recount the story of a group's "true nature," plot helps.
Indeed, emplotment is usually the trick of the trade: boy is bullied by other
kids at school, boy tries to conform, boy comes out to himself, then to his
parents, who reject him. Boy meets another boy like him, boy falls in love
with other boy, boy settles down with other boy, adopts kids with other boy,
goes to church, coaches little league, collects stamps. Boy wants to marry
other boy but can't. Boy yearns that when he can finally marry other boy his
parents will accept him and so will society. The plot inevitably arcs toward
a happy ending, and the project is to keep the story a romance rather than a
tragedy, characterized by redemption (sometimes even atonement) rather
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than censure or reproof. Thus we see a litigation narrative characterized by
"language, work, and desire" as Butler suggested.2 4
My aim in locating dignity and rights within a narrative, in portraying
them as diachronic rather than synchronic in nature, is to illustrate how the
foundational relationship between responsibility-rights and dignity as told
by Waldron doesn't work in the same way for all rights-based claims. By
this I don't mean to misunderstand him to be providing an analytic frame
for all rights claims, but rather I hope to offer a more complex account of
the sub-set of rights claims that are tethered to responsibility and that are in
important ways launched by an appeal to human dignity. I'll unpack this
particular concern after walking through the example of the same-sex
marriage litigation.

In the summer of 2010, Judge Vaughn Walker in the Northern District of
California declared that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional.2 5 Prop 8, or the
California Marriage Protection Act, 26 changed the California Constitution to
define marriage as a union between one man and one woman, and was
intended to undo a ruling from the California Supreme Court that had found
that same-sex couples had a constitutional right to marry.27 Judge Walker's
decision signals, to my mind, a rather significant shift in the nature of civil
rights claims in this country away from the kinds of reasons that were given
when African Americans and women first started winning civil rights cases
in the 1950s, 60s, 70s and 80s.
What we see in a number of the same-sex marriage cases around the
country, but surely in the Prop 8 case, is a revival of the legal importance of
dignity, indeed two different conceptions of dignity. These cases turn, on
the one hand, on the inherent dignity of human beings, and on the other, on
the dignity of the institution of marriage and the relationships that deserve
the blessing of the marital form. Waldron's notion of dignity, rights, and
responsibilities is in many respects consonant with the thinking underlying
the wins in the same-sex marriage context.
The tone, the ethical stakes, and the turn to values in these cases is really
quite different from what we, as civil rights lawyers, had come to expect
from the reasoning in the sex and race cases over the past half century.
You've got to admit that it's kind of ironic that morality has come to the
24. Butler, supra note 18.
25. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
26. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5.
27. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008).
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rescue of homosexuals in the last few years, when morality has been, since
Leviticus, the justification for the condemnation, criminalization,
stigmatization, and in many cases violence meted out against gay men and
lesbians in almost all precincts of the globe.
So let me back up for a moment and sketch out what I understand to
have been the ethical frame within which a notion of race and sex-based
justice has been spelled out by the Supreme Court in the modem era.
Starting with the racial equality cases in the 1950s, for the most part the
Supreme Court's approach to group-based fairness has been Aristotelian in
nature. Recall that for Aristotle injustice lay in treating similarly situated
classes dissimilarly. The starting point for Aristotle and for the courts in
cases where unjust or unequal treatment is alleged is to ask whether the
disfavored group is substantially similar to the favored group. For example,
are thirsty black people and thirsty white people substantially similar in
their desire to quench their thirst from a drinking fountain? If so, then
separate drinking fountains violate an Aristotelian norm of treating like
things alike. This approach was stated most clearly by Justice John Harlan
in 1896 when he said: "Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens
are equal before the law."" He was well ahead of his time when he wrote
this in the late nineteenth century, but by the middle of the twentieth
century his formulation of legal fairness had been embraced as the dominant
view by virtually all U.S. courts.
This approach called "Color-Blind Constitutionalism" came to be
applied by the courts in a fairly mechanical or formal way. It's a simple
concept and it went like this: the Constitution prohibits the sorting of people
on the basis of their race. Period. The reasons for the sorting are irrelevant,
as race-conscious policies are presumptively illegitimate. Imagine the kinds
of situations they had in mind in the early to mid twentieth century-mostly
Jim Crow policies segregating blacks from whites. All of these were illegal
under a color-blind rule because it was assumed that any racial distinction
was motivated by a notion of racial inferiority of black people. But what
about policies that took race into account in order to address and remediate
historical racial injustice, such as affirmative action? Since color-blind
constitutionalism was uninterested in benign or good reasons why people
were being treated differently on the basis of their race, affirmative action
policies have had a hard time in the courts. Taking race into account for any
reason was illegitimate-like things must be treated alike. This injunction

28.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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against race-based sorting enacts Waldron's "equal rank" notion of
humanity.
As the Court's jurisprudence on racial equality developed over time, the
question of why racial thinking was wrong, or even the immorality of
racism itself, garnered very little attention. That sort of thick discussion of
morality was not relevant to the legal inquiry. Instead, the question to be
considered was whether a formal legal rule requiring color-blindness had
been violated.
In the 1970s, the women's rights movement turned to the courts to
challenge policies that disfavored women. To succeed they echoed the kinds
of reasoning that had been adopted in the race cases.2 9 Legal formalism
dominated the Court's jurisprudence in the sex discrimination cases just as
it had in the race discrimination cases. The argument went like this: women
were, for the most part, similarly situated to men and could not be legally
treated differently from men. A kind of sex-blind constitutionalism was
quickly brought to bear on the sex discrimination claims of this period. Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, a women's rights lawyer with the ACLU in the 1970s, was
the primary architect of the sex-blind approach. (Of course pregnancy poses
a difficult problem for this line of thinking, but I'll leave that issue for
another essay.)
Just as in the race cases, over the last half century the Supreme Court has
largely committed itself to a mechanical approach to fairness in the race and
sex cases. When the Virginia Military Institute, a men's military college,
was sued by several young women who were denied admission, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, then a Justice of the Supreme Court, noted that VMI's mission
was to produce "citizen soldiers . . . imbued with love of learning, confident

in the functions and attitudes of leadership, [and who wanted to be]
advocates of the American democracy and free enterprise system, . . . ready

to defend their country in time of national peril."" She found for the Court
that men and women were similarly situated and equally qualified to
achieve this goal:
Surely that goal is great enough to accommodate women, who
today count as citizens in our American democracy equal in
stature to men. Just as surely, the Commonwealth's great goal is
not substantially advanced by women's categorical exclusion, in

See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 545 (1996) (quoting VMI BD. OF VISITORS,
MIsSION STUDY COMM. REPORT (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
29.
30.
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total disregard of their individual merit,
Commonwealth's premier "citizen-soldier" corps.

from

the

Thus the Supreme Court has opted to ground its reasoning in the race
and sex cases in a kind of dispassion toward the matter, instead of offering
strong moral condemnation of racism, sexism, and the like. To the extent
that there is a value at stake, it is the value of neutrality. As a moral
ambition, it's pretty hard to get all riled up about neutrality.
But when it comes to the rights of gay people, the Supreme Court has
had no trouble getting all moral and all riled up. Moralizing did almost all
the work in the Court's first significant engagement with gay rights in 1986.
The case, Bowers v. Hardwick, was a challenge to the Georgia sodomy
law. 32 An Atlanta Police officer had come to Michael Hardwick's house to
serve a summons on him for throwing out a beer bottle in the wrong bin
outside of a bar. The officer was let into the house by a roommate and
found Hardwick in his bedroom in the embraces of another man.3 4 He
arrested Hardwick then and there for violating the Georgia sodomy law.3 s
The ACLU had been waiting for years for a case like this to raise the
privacy rights of gay men and lesbians, and these facts seemed perfect.
But the Supreme Court did not see it the same way as the ACLU. Justice
Byron White, who wrote the majority opinion, treated the case as no
different from an arrest for viewing child pornography-the conduct is
deplorable and the fact that it took place in a private home should make no
difference when it comes to the legitimacy of a law that makes it criminal.36
He wrote for the Court:
Against this background, to claim that a right to engage in such
conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious....
Plainly enough, otherwise illegal conduct is not always immunized
whenever it occurs in the home. 37
In his view, the Constitution creates no grounds to invalidate laws based in
public morality, and if the people of Georgia think homosexuality is
31.

Id. at 545-46.

32. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 187-88 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas,
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
33. Janet R. Jakobsen & Ann Pellegrini, LOVE THE SIN: SEXUAL REGULATION AND THE
LIMITS OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE 24 (2003).
34. Alice FlIetwood Bartee, PRIVACY RIGHTS: CASES LOST AND CAUSES WON BEFORE THE
SUPREME COURT 48 (2006).

35.
36.

Id.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195.

37.

Id. at 194-95.
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immoral it is within their right to criminalize it. Chief Justice Burger went
even further, writing that the condemnation of homosexuality is firmly
rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical teaching." After all, he noted,
the Romans punished homosexuals with the death penalty, and legal codes
during the English Reformation described sodomy as a "crime against
nature," and an "offense of 'deeper malignity' than rape." 39 The act was
considered so heinous that "the very mention of it was a 'disgrace to human
nature."' 40 The very mention of it.
Michael Hardwick lost his case in the Supreme Court partly because a
majority of the Court viewed homosexuality with disgust. Court observers
at the time were also quick to point out that more than the rights of gay
people were at stake in the case. Then, as now, whenever a constitutional
right to privacy was in play, Roe v. Wade4 ' and the issue of abortion were
not far from people's minds. The Court's treatment of Hardwick's privacy
claim signaled a reluctance to recognize a general constitutional right to
privacy or to extend such a right any further than they already had. For this
reason Justice White insisted in his opinion in Bowers:
[W]e think it evident that none of the rights announced in the
[reproductive rights] cases bears any resemblance to the claimed
constitutional right of homosexuals to engage in acts of sodomy . .
. No connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the
one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been
demonstrated.42
The Bowers decision was a devastating blow to the young gay rights
movement. I remember the day it was announced. I had just graduated from
law school and was sitting in my kitchen in San Francisco studying for the
California bar when I heard the news come in on the radio. I wondered what
profession I was about to enter where the Chief Justice of our highest court
thought the very mention of homosexuality was a disgrace to human kind.
The Bowers decision positioned the United States as an outlier among
our peers in the developed world. Just as the Supreme Court endorsed the
criminalization of homosexuality in such ugly terms, other jurisdictions
such as the European Union and South Africa were not only decriminalizing
homosexuality but also extending affirmative constitutional protections to

38. Id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
39. Id. at 197 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
40. Id.
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190-91.
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gay people.43 Bowers v. Hardwick44 quickly became an embarrassment for
the Supreme Court, and Justice Powell, who had been the deciding vote in
the case, told a small group of law students shortly thereafter that he wished
he had voted with the dissent.45
The defeat that was the Supreme Court decision in Bowers helps us
understand something important, and under-explored by Waldron in the
Shoen lecture, about the relationship of rights to dignity. If you were a gay
or lesbian person living in the United States in 1986, you felt something
more than that the Supreme Court had made a terrible mistake. The Court's
decision was not merely something untruthful or unkind being said about
us, it actually did something to us. It is hard to imagine a more devastating
way in which to have the dignity of a group renounced than to be described
as a disgrace to human kind. But it did more than deny us the dignity we
sought in bringing the case. It shamed us and it ranked us as something less
than heterosexual people. In this sense, the denial of rights was
performative, particularly when done as spectacularly as in Bowers. It
accomplished a form of degradation, and in so doing pulled off the creation
of caste-lower (homo) and higher (hetero) caste.
But sometimes losing a case, and losing it so stunningly, can galvanize
political action to take another run at the problem. The night the decision
was announced I joined hundreds, likely thousands of protesters on the
streets of San Francisco outraged at having been punched in the face by the
Supreme Court. We understood that we had work to do. We had not made
ourselves recognizable to the public and to legal authority as a community
worthy of full constitutional protection and the dignity that recognition
would confer.
So that work began. On school boards, on little league fields, at PTA
meetings, in churches, in workplaces, grocery stores-everywhere. We set
out to demonstrate in fora both quotidian and extraordinary that we were
not a perverse Other, that we were respectable citizens, that we were just
like you. It is important to understand the turn this work took. The project
was not one of sexual liberation, as had been the approach of the early
Stonewall activists, of "live and let live," or "keep your laws off our
bodies." This was not a politics of neutrality or sexual liberty, nor did it
echo the liberal kinds of arguments made by H.L.A. Hart in his debates with

43. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 Eur. Ct. H.R. 149 (1981); Nat'l Coal. for Gay and
Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Justice, 1998 (12) BCLR 1517 (CC) (S. Afr.).
44. 478 U.S. 186.
45. Anand Agneshwar, Powell On Sodomy; Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3, col. 1.
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Lord Patrick Devlin about the legitimacy of criminalizing sodomy.46 Rather
the gay politics of the 1990s took a decidedly normative turn in favor of
demonstrating to a skeptical American public that we were normal,
respectable, and responsible citizens, not the perverts that Chief Justice
Burger had described in Bowers. In short, the shame of Bowers was met
with a politics of redemption.
Little by little, this work paid off and the wrongness of Bowers became
unbearable to the Court. Seventeen years later (a short period of time in the
history of the Supreme Court) the issue returned to the high court in
Lawrence v. Texas 47 raising very similar facts to the Bowers case: two men
arrested for having sex in the privacy of their own home. 48 This time,
Justice Anthony Kennedy, wrote for a slim, one-vote majority and found
that indeed there is a constitutional problem with criminalizing sex between
consenting adults in private. But he did so in a curious way, by refraining
the question not as about a right to sex but as about a right to a relationship
with the person of your choosing.
Justice White in Bowers had rejected any connection between
homosexuality and family, marriage or procreation, but Justice Kennedy
sutured these domains back together, seeing the rights at issue in Lawrence
as analogous to those enjoyed by heterosexual people: all people, regardless
of their sexual orientation have a liberty right to form a personal, intimate
relationship with another consenting adult, regardless of that person's sex.4 9
If Justice Kennedy had stopped there, Lawrence would have established
a kind of "sexual orientation-blind" rule similar to the color-blind rule in the
race cases. In fact, that approach is exactly how Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor approached the issue in Lawrence in her concurrence in the
case." But she couldn't get anyone else on the Court to join her in this
reasoning, so she wrote only for herself. Justice Kennedy's majority, by
contrast, rejected a mere neutrality rule when it came to criminalizing
certain kinds of sex, and rested the outcome on a strong moral account of
the essential worth of people who just happen to be homosexual."
He wrote that the Texas statute "demeans the lives of homosexual
persons," they "are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State
46. Hart's view turned on the application of the harm principle: if no one is harmed by the
practice the state has no legitimate reason to regulate or criminalize it. H.L.A. Hart, Immorality
and Treason, LISTENER (BBC), July 3, 1959, at 162-63; LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE
ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
47. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
48. Id. at 562-63.
49. Id. at 566.
50. Id. at 578.
51. Id. at 567.
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cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their
private sexual conduct a crime."52 He then repeated soaring language that
had been used in an earlier abortion rights case: "At the heart of liberty is
the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life."53
I have to confess that many of us, in reading the opinion, were surprised
that sodomy laws were found to violate the "sweet mystery of life" rule.
The Lawrence case signaled an important and new direction that the
courts would take in interpreting the constitutional rights of gay people as
compared with African Americans and women. The moralizing of Bowers
that left a homosexual minority vulnerable to the disgust and judgment of
the majority was not replaced in Lawrence with a rule requiring the equal
treatment of similarly situated persons when it comes to their intimate lives.
Rather, in Lawrence, Justice Kennedy gave the boot to Justice White's and
Burger's strong negative moral vision by substituting his own moral
reasoning grounded in an almost spiritual reverence for the dignity of the
human and a call that the law respect the most intimate choices each person
makes about the meaning of their lives. In a somewhat surprising turn of
events, the gay rights cases were starting to share a greater similarity with
the abortion and reproductive autonomy cases than the cases recognizing
the civil rights of African Americans and women.
Part of what made this shift possible was a complete reconceptualization
by the Supreme Court of what these cases were about. The Bowers court
treated Michael Hardwick's claim as about a constitutional right to
sodomy-a kind of non-normative sex-and found this an easy thing to
dismiss. But when the Lawrence Court took up the issue, sex dropped out of
the picture entirely. Dignity and respect of intimate relationships took its
place. This required that Justice Kennedy frame the facts of the case in
terms that were consonant with the larger normative project of
respectability, but may not have actually been true.54 What is important is
52.

Id. at 578.

53. Id. at 574 (citing Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
54. Justice Kennedy's finding in Lawrence that the Texas sodomy law violated a
fundamental liberty right was premised upon a story he made up about Lawrence and Gardner
being in a relationship in which their interactions allowed them to elaborate their "concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life." Dale Carpenter's
work on the backstory of this "relationship" tells a quite different tale. See Dale Carpenter, The
Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1464 (2004). Carpenter's description
of Lawrence and Garner's "relationship" is quite different from that portrayed by Kennedy's
opinion. The two men, Lawrence (white) and Garner (black), were not in a relationship, but
were more likely occasional sex partners. Id. at 1478. The night of the arrest another sex partner
of Garner's called the police to report that "a black male was going crazy" in Lawrence's
apartment "and he was armed with a gun." (Carpenter notes that a racial epithet rather than
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that the Supreme Court was willing to welcome lesbian and gay people into
the community of rights-bearing citizens not because of the sex we have,
but rather because of the "enduring personal bonds" we seek-bonds that
gain constitutional protection for reasons that are not squarely or even
obliquely about sex. Criminal sodomy laws could be understood as an
affront to "personal dignity and autonomy"" because gay people had a
"right to demand respect" for their relationships "just as heterosexual
persons do.""
So, you might be thinking, what's wrong with a turn toward dignity?
Well, to understand how dignity is a complex value in which to anchor
civil rights claims we have to look no further than the same-sex marriage
cases that were filed on the heels of the Lawrence decision. Indiana came
first. An appellate court dismissed a lawsuit challenging the state's
heterosexuals-only marriage law on the grounds that since only
heterosexual couples can become accidentally pregnant they need the
structure and responsibility of the institution of marriage so that the children
of these accidents aren't harmed by their parents' irresponsible
reproduction." Gay couples, on the other hand, do not get pregnant by
accident. Rather they have to do a lot of work to have children: adopting,
using insemination or surrogacy services, or other deliberate means. As
such they are likely to be much more responsible reproducers, thereby not
needing the institution of marriage to shore up otherwise weak family
structures.
When this decision came out of Indiana we all thought it was a bit of a
joke, and dismissed it, with high and mighty East Coast arrogance, as the
nalve musings of midwestern know-nothings. But then a marriage challenge
was filed in New York State and made its way to New York's highest court,
and guess what they found? That heterosexual's irresponsible reproduction
could justify limiting civil marriage to different sex couples."
So morality, in the form of dignity and responsibility, doesn't obviously
cut in any predictable direction when it comes to elaborating the civil rights
of gay men and lesbians. In 1986, moral reasoning in the form of disgust for
homosexuality justified upholding the criminalization of sodomy. Then, in
2003, the freedom to enter a relationship and define for one's self the sweet
mysteries of life required the overturning of criminal sodomy laws. And in
"black man" was probably the term used.) Id. at 1479. The police arrived at the apartment and
found Lawrence and Garner having sex. Id. at 1480.
55. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
56. Id. at 574-75.
57. Morrison v. Sandler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 35 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
58. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 12 (N.Y. 2006).
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2005 in Indiana and 2006 in New York, gay couples could be denied access
to marriage because they were too responsible in comparison with the
biologically and ethically challenged heterosexuals who were getting
pregnant willy-nilly.
I have to say that I didn't see any of this coming-moral arguments
flipping in favor of and then against the civil rights claims of gay people.
So this brings us to the Prop 8 case in California where morality has
figured centrally. Of course those who supported Proposition 8, and wanted
to ban gay marriage, used strong moral arguments that allowing same-sex
couples to marry would ruin the institution of marriageS" and indeed ruin the
unions of those straight couples that were now married.60
The same-sex couples challenging Proposition 8 could have responded
by meeting the moral arguments of their opposition with a demand that they
be treated fairly and equally to heterosexual couples who want to marry.
They could borrow from the race and sex cases, extrapolating from colorblindness to orientation-blindness. Let's just think for a moment how this
would go. There are a few different ways to make the case:
First, the gay couples could argue that when the state is issuing marriage
licenses it should do so in a way that does not take the applicants' sexual
orientation into account. The state shouldn't discriminate on the basis of
sexual orientation when it issues fishing licenses or drivers' licenses and
certainly shouldn't do so when it issues marriage licenses since all
applicants, regardless of the sex of their loved one, are similarly situated.
The sorting of license applicants on the basis of sexual orientation would be
the issue, not the virtues of the type of license being applied for. We could
call this the Justice O'Connor, orientation-blind approach, which would be
grounded in neutral equality principles.
Or in the alternative, they could argue that the state should not interfere
in a person's freedom to choose the person they love as their spouse. Of
course, we might support some limits on this freedom. As one commentator
put it: "People do not have a right to marry their dog, their house, their
refrigerator, July 21, or a rose petal." 6' But the idea here would be that the
state's interest is in promoting individual freedom, not in endorsing
59. The Alabama Sanctity of Marriage Amendment, amending the Alabama Constitution
in 2006, offers a good example: "Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized between a man and
a woman, which, when the legal capacity and consent of both parties is present, establishes their
relationship as husband and wife, and which is recognized by the state as a civil contract." ALA.
CONST. art. I, § 36.03.
60. Michael T. Schmitt et al., The Role of Heterosexual Identity Threat in Differential
Support for Same-Sex 'Civil Unions' versus 'Marriages',10 GROUP PROCESS & INTERGROUP
REL. 443,

61.

453 (2007).
Cass Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 2081, 2083 (2005).
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heterosexuality as the official state sexual orientation. This argument would
derive from a neutral "personal freedom"-based value.
But that's not, by and large, how these cases are being argued, or at least
not how they're being argued in the first instance. In this new generation of
gay rights cases, neutrality is out and morality is in. And it's really in. The
trial in the Prop 8 case in San Francisco is a perfect example. The testimony
by the four plaintiffs, two men and two women, focused primarily on their
desire for respectability, their longing for the sacred blessing and societal
recognition that marriage confers, on the fact that being married would be
better for raising children, and finally on the disgrace of exile from the
sacred domain of marriage. On top of that, they have argued that the state
should play a vital role in promoting the institution of marriage and that
including same-sex couples in the institution would be good for marriage
more generally.
When asked by Ted Olsen, one the of the gay couples' lawyers: "Have
you encountered instances where because you are not married you were
placed in embarrassing or awkward situations?" Jeff Zarrillo, one of the
plaintiffs, testified: "One example is when Paul and I travel, it's always an
awkward situation at the front desk at the hotel . . . the individual working

at the desk will look at us with a perplexed look on his face and say, 'You
ordered a king-size bed. Is that really what you want?"' 6 2 Or It is always
certainly an awkward situation walking to the bank and saying, 'My partner
and I want to open a joint bank account,' and hearing, you know, 'Is it a
business account? A partnership?' It would just be a lot easier [to be able to
say]: 'My husband and I are here to check into a room. My husband and I
are here to open a bank account."' 63
When asked by Mr. Olsen about why they haven't had children, Mr.
Zarrillo said: "Paul and I believe that ... the important step in order to have
children would be for us to be married. It would make it easier for-for us,
for our children, to explain our relationship, for our children to be able to
explain our relationship."64
Mr. Olsen then asked Mr. Zarrillo why he and his partner were not
domestic partners-the California domestic partnership law confers on
same-sex couples all of the legal and economic benefits of marriage, just
under a different legal name.6 5 Zarrillo answered: "we hold marriage in such
62.

Transcript of Record at 83-84, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D.

Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292-VRW), available at http://www.afer.org/wp-content/uploads/
2010/01/Perry-Vol-1-1-1 1-10.pdf.
63. Id. at 84.
64.
65.

Id. at 81-82.
Id. at 82.

DIGNIFYING RIGHTS

43: 1177]
high regard .

.

1195

. [Domestic partnership would not give] due respect to the

relationship that we have had for almost nine years. Only a marriage could
do that." 66
When his boyfriend, partner, hopefully spouse Paul Katami was asked a
similar question about why marriage was so important to them, he said: "By
allowing us full access to [the rights and identity of marriage it makes us] a
full participant as a citizen of our country and our state."
Kris Perry, one of the other plaintiffs, testified in response to Olsen's
questioning: "the state isn't letting me feel happy. It's not letting me
experience my full potential, because I am not permitted to experience
everything I might feel if this barrier were removed."6
When she was asked about what the institution of marriage meant to her,
she said:
So in some ways it's hard for me to grasp what it would even
mean, but I do see other people who are married and I-and I
think what it looks like is that you are honored and respected by
your family. Your children know what your relationship is. And

when you leave your home and you go to work or you go out in
the world, people know what your relationship means. And so then
everyone can, in a sense, join in supporting your relationship,
which at this point I can only observe as an outsider.69
When she was pushed further about what would happen if she and her
girlfriend were able to marry, Perry described marriage almost like a club
she was barred from joining.70 She said:

I think it would be an enormous relief to our friends who are
married. Our straight heterosexual friends that are married almost
view us in a way that-I know they love us, but I think they feel
sorry for us and I can't stand it. You know, many of them are

either in their second marriage or their first marriage, but
nevertheless, they have a word and they belong to this institution
or this group. And I can think of a time recently when I went with
Sandy happily to a football game at the high school where two of
our kids go and we went up the bleachers and we were greeted
with these smiling faces of other parents sitting there waiting for

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 82-83.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 155.
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the game to start. And I was so acutely aware that I thought, they
are all married and I'm not.7'
The gist of the plaintiffs' arguments here is that California has set up a
segregated system: different sex couples can get married while same-sex
couples can get domestic partnered. From here, the normative argument
could go in two different directions. One would point out that the different
legalization schemes for different-sex and same-sex communicated a
message of inferiority about or stigmatized the less-favored group-samesex couples. The account of discrimination or injury need not "carry a brief'
for the good being denied same-sex couples. Instead it turned on the fact of
the different treatment, just as we might with drinking fountains, lunch
counters or train cars.
The other direction-one on which the arguments in the marriage cases
increasingly rely-maintains that not only are same-sex couples being
treated differently from different-sex couples, they're being treated worse.
The emphasis here is on the worse treatment not the different treatment. It's
one thing to say the different treatment imposes a badge of inferiority, it's
quite another to claim that the two groups are being treated differently and
one group is getting something wonderful and the other something
obviously inferior. Like one group's drinking fountain dispenses
champagne and the other group is getting water from Lake Erie.
Here's where we see a disagreement brewing in the lesbian and gay
community-about the strategy to treat marriage like champagne and
domestic partnership or civil unions like water from Lake Erie. The one is a
social and legal institution that confers legitimacy, respectability and
dignity to the couples who can get it, and the other brings with it
illegitimacy, shame and impropriety. In some cases, the same-sex couples
have gone even further and adopted the argument that marriage is the ideal
family formation in which responsible reproduction can and should take
place for both homo and heterosexual couples.
These are very different approaches to why same-sex couples should be
permitted to marry-one that disables the state from taking sexual
orientation into account in the distribution of public licenses and other
goods, and the other on the blessings conferred from inclusion in a
fundamentally dignifying institution: marriage. The former invests in a
principle of neutrality while the latter invests in the dignity of marriage and
kinds of relationships that are deserving of marriage's blessings.
The strategy pursued in the Prop 8 case illustrates well the normative
turn the gay community has taken in the years since the Bowers defeat. It
71.

Id. at 155-56.
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also helps us understand something fundamental about the relationship of
responsibility to rights to dignity. Lesbian and gay people have mounted a
ritualized performance of responsibilized citizenship that, over time, was
used to convince courts and the public that they have put their errant ways
behind them and/or that they have been horribly misunderstood. It can no
longer be said that they are promiscuous, value Eros over kinship, are
unable to form and maintain long-term commitments, and love in dangerous
and forbidden ways. Having become recognizable as respectable, the court
could recognize them as dignified, rights-bearing subjects and equal in rank
to other (heterosexual) legal citizens.
Now it may seem odd to be critical of such an important victory for
lesbian and gay people. What I want us to consider, however, is how the
judicial conferral of dignity and the recognition of equal rank in a case such
as this comes at a price. A recognition-based project of this sort provides
few tools with which to transform or render more just the fundamental
underlying norms of the institution into which a group seeks inclusion. As
Judith Butler has observed in another context:
The problem is not merely how to include more people within
existing norms, but to consider how existing norms allocate
recognition differentially. What new norms are possible, and how
are they wrought? What might be done to produce a more
egalitarian set of conditions for recognizability? 72
I am concerned that an opportunity has been lost in the same-sex
marriage cases to expand the social and legal ideal of family beyond a fairly
traditional model. After all, through history the institution of marriage has
not been all that great for women. Who better than the lesbian and gay
community to think more broadly about what it means to love, care for and
have responsibility for others?
But even more than that, if these cases are about taking stock of the
benefits and worth of various family forms, why insist on winning in a way
that reinforces the vulnerability and illegitimacy of people who do not, or
cannot, marry? I recall watching the arguments before the Iowa Supreme
Court in the same-sex marriage case in that state not too long ago. The
lawyer representing the interests of one of the plaintiffs, a child of one of
the lesbian couples who could not marry, told a story about how their
daughter could not enroll in day care because the day care center required
that the parents of all the children be married. He told the Court that the
parents should be able to marry so that their child could enroll in the
center's program. But it strikes me that the problem with the day care
72.

BUTLER, supra note 18, at 6.
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center's policy was not that Iowa prohibited same-sex couples from
marrying, but that the marital status of the parents was at all relevant to a
child's eligibility for child care. Children of married parents and children of
unmarried parents are similarly situated relative to their qualifications for
childcare.
When the Iowa Supreme Court ruled, it found that the state had a
constitutional obligation to open up marriage to same-sex couples, but it did
so for reasons very different from Judge Walker's opinion in the Prop 8
case." Whereas Walker reinforced a notion that only respectable people
may marry, and gay people are surely respectable, the Iowa Supreme Court
steered clear of the kind of moralism grounded in human dignity that we've
seen in so many other Court decisions on this issue. The Iowa court started
with the state motto, printed on their flag: "Our liberties we prize and our
rights we will maintain."7 4 Building on this notion, the court wrote: "Like
all Iowans, [the gay and lesbian plaintiffs] prize their liberties and live
within the borders of this state with the expectation that their rights will be
maintained and protected-a belief embraced by our state motto."7 5 The
court made every effort to situate the marriage case within the context of a
time-honored Iowan commitment to treating people equally. 6 Whether it
was a refusal to recognize the legitimacy of slavery in 1839, a recognition
that racial segregation violated the Iowa Constitution in 1873 long before
the U.S. Supreme Court did in 1954, or being the first state to grant women
the right to practice law in 1869, Iowans have had their own strong sense of
justice and fairness, and as the court noted, "in each of those instances, our
state approached a fork in the road toward fulfillment of our constitution's
ideals and reaffirmed the 'absolute equality of all' persons before the law as
'the very foundation principle of our government."'7
The Iowa court's approach, based in neutrality and treating similarly
situated people similarly, is an outlier among the same-sex marriage cases,
for most courts prefer the thickly normative, dignity-based approach. The
Iowa Court's reasoning situates the new gay civil rights as the next step in a
long tradition of civil rights claims for women and African Americans, and
it handed a win to gay rights not at the expense of creating a class of sexual
and domestic outlaws, or ranking forms of human attachment, desire, love,
kinship and intimacy.

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
Id. at 872 n.1.
Id. at 872.
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Id. at 877 (quoting Coger v. Nw. Union Packet Co., 37 Iowa 145, 153 (1873)).
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What is more, the approach the Iowa Court took meant it didn't have to
weigh in on the moral worth of marriage as opposed to non-marriage.
Instead it found that so long as the state is in the marriage business, it must
make it available to all in a non-discriminatory way. We know how to make
this argument, it's the approach being taken in the gays in the military
cases: you can agree that barring gay men and lesbians from openly serving
in the military is a kind of discrimination while not necessarily carrying a
brief for the military. By that I mean, you don't have to sign up for
militarism to appreciate that homosexuals are similarly situated to
heterosexuals when it comes to military service. What troubles me in the
marriage context is that many of the parties have taken the view that
challenging the discrimination in heterosexual-only marriage laws entails
becoming a congregant in the ministry of marriage.

Toward the end of his paper, Waldron offers a cautionary note: "I can
imagine that once the responsibility-form for rights is made available ...
there may be a temptation by some people to use it in ways that other
people will want to resist."" The example he provides is of pro-life, or antiabortion, advocates "arguing that a woman's right over her body and her
reproductive capacities is to be understood as a responsibility . . . rather

than as a pure right of willful choice."79 I have a different kind of
consequentialist concern in mind than the one Waldron suggests. Rather
than worry about how the responsibility-rights form may be put to good use
by those whose ends I disagree with, I am discomfited by its use by those
whom I see as allies. Strategies grounded in dignity and responsibility may
provide a new avenue to secure important rights we have long been denied.
But they do so at a cost, and a cost not all of us are willing to bear.
Waldron's essay challenges us to consider how "some rights actually are
responsibilities,"o and that what conjoins right and responsibility, on this
account, is a foundational commitment to human dignity. Waldron's
argument comes off as synchronic in nature: responsibility-rights are an
expression of the dignity that each person's humanity entails. But the
marriage cases tell a different story, one that imposes a different kind of
temporality into the picture. That temporality is, in important respects,
redemptive in nature. Collapsing rights into responsibilities without
78.
79.
80.

Waldron, supra note 1, at 1135.
Id.
Id. at 1107.
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unpacking the steps that make those rights "take hold" conceals the degree
to which an individual's or group's dignity is dependent upon and the
product of the epistemic capacities of others to apprehend that dignity. So
too, it takes as given the frames that work to differentiate the dignified from
the depraved, and how those frames operate as a disciplinary set of norms
that facilitate that recognition. Perhaps most problematically, political and
legal strategies that tether rights to responsibility are less able to provide the
tools to transform the very norms and conditions that make the equalization
of rank possible.
To be sure, Waldron's thoughtful account of responsibility-rights in the
Shoen Lecture makes an important contribution to our understanding the
multiple forms that rights claims can take in liberal society. But as Waldron
also notes, simply because a particular right is available doesn't tell us
anything about whether or not it is a good thing to pull it off the shelf and
put it to work. That's where judgment of a different kind must intrude. To
my judgment, responsibility-rights can be, and often are, won at a cost too
high to be paid.

